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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AVIATION: LOCAL AIRPORT PROPRIETORS MAY IMPOSE NOISE RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT PROVIDED THE REGULATIONS ARE
REASONABLE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY-British Airways Board and
Compagnie Nationale Air France v. The Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, et al., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
I. BACKGROUND
As a response to growing American domination of the international
aircraft market, France and Great Britain collaborated in the produc-
tion of a supersonic passenger airplane, the Concorde. Over a period
of thirteen years, almost $3 billion was expended on the plane's
development, including over $100 million to lessen the noise produced
by the Concorde. This expenditure was necessitated by the fact that
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) allowed local airport pro-
prietors to control and limit the types of aircraft which could use their
facilities on the basis of noise production.
Congressional policy had been to delegate to local airport owners
the job of controlling noise at their airports by the promulgation of
non-discriminatory regulations. This power was severly limited by Con-
gressional acts which made it clear that exclusive statutory responsibili-
ty for aircraft noise abatement rested with the federal government.
Voluntary delegation of authority in the area was subject to ultimate
federal control and possible revocation.
The authority of local airport operators was also subject to two fur-
ther restrictions not directly related to noise, those being that no
regulations could be imposed which would place an undue burden on
interstate or foreign commerce or which would unjustly discriminate
between different categories of airport users.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA) is the
operator of New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK).I
In 1951, the PA adopted a regulation prohibiting any aircraft from
landing at or taking off from any PA airport without permission from
the authority. The PA eventually adopted 112 PNdB (perceived noise
in decibels) as the maximum permissible noise level for any plane using
a PA airport, a standard which is still in effect.
'The Port Authority also operates Newark International Airport, in Newark,
New Jersey, and LaGuardia Airport, in Queens, New York City.
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The operators of Concorde, British Airways and Air France, ap-
plied to the FAA in late summer 1975 for amendment of their opera-
tions specifications, to permit the use of the SST in transatlantic ser-
vice. In response to this request, the Secretary of Transportation,
William Coleman, issued a Directive and Order on February 4, 1975,
allowing each carrier to fly two Concordes into JFK each day and one
per day into Dulles International Airport, in Virginia. These were pro-
visional amendments only, valid for sixteen months and subject to im-
mediate emergency revocation. Conceding that the decision involved
"environmental, technological and international considerations that are
as complex as they are controversial," Secretary Coleman reasoned that
the only way in which a subjective matter such as the effect of noise
could be analyzed would be under actual operating conditions. Cole-
man added that he could find no compelling reasons for not allowing
the test flights.
The Port Authority, however, could cite many significant reasons
for refusing to allow the test flights. Not only was Secretary Coleman's
decision seen as an infringement on the PA's rights and powers, but
there was also the problem of the residents of Howard Beach and the
Rockaways in Queens County. These homeowners, who lived under the
flight paths of the JFK runways, saw Concorde not as a technological
marvel, but as a serious threat to their accustomed way of life. These
residents initiated picketing and letter writing campaigns and formed
huge, extremely slow-moving motorcades which all but caused traffic
on the access roads to JFK to come to a halt. Repeated injunctions
against these "drive-ins" were unsuccessful. Uneasy local politicians
pressured the PA to prevent the landings. These local residents were
not impressed by Secretary Coleman's impassioned argument in favor
of the project.
Yet, while forcefully urging that the SST be allowed to land,
Secretary Coleman recognized the right of the PA to refuse landing
rights to any aircraft for "any legitimate and legally binding reason."
Disregarding the urgings of the federal government, the PA banned
Concorde from landing at JFK. It did not apply its 112 PNdB rule,
stating that the special characteristics of the plane's low-pitched
rumbling noise were worthy of special research and that further in-
quiry would be required before Concorde would be allowed to land in
New York. Concorde was therefore banned from New York as of
March 11, 1976, pending a six-month study of operating experiences
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at Dulles, Heathrow and Charles DeGaulle airports. The PA never
concluded this study.
II. THE CASE
British Airways and Air France brought suit in United States
District Court (Southern District of New York) to have the PA ban
declared invalid. The plaintiffs claimed that the ban offended interna-
tional treaties and agreements and illegally invaded an area of regula-
tion which had been traditionally considered as being pre-empted by
the federal government and specifically pre-empted by the Secretary of
Transportation. The PA countered by asserting that Congress had not
pre-empted a local airport proprietor's authority to accept or reject
aircraft for takeoff or landing on the basis of local regulations ap-
propriate for the area.
A. The Question of Federal Supremacy in the Area of Aviation
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 established the federal govern-
ment's pre-eminent role in the control of air traffic. Under this act the
federal administrator was given the power to regulate the use of all
navigable airspace. Included within that power was the right to super-
vise "such developmental work and service testing as tend to the crea-
tion of improved aircraft .. "2 When the administrative powers of
the FAA were made subject to the control of the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary was also given the power to promote
research relating to noise abatement "with particular attention to air-
craft noise." That federal authority in the realm of aviation law was
paramount was readily accepted by the District Court.3
Congress first exercised its power to control aircraft noise in 1968.
The statute was clear in granting the federal government the exclusive
statutory responsibility for noise abatement through the regulation of
flight operations and aircraft design.4 A Senate report accompanying
the bill pointed out, however, that the rights of the airport proprietor
to create local noise regulations were not superseded by the bill, so
long as such rules were not discriminatory. Much of the local authority
over noise control, the court found, was delegated federal power and
subject to "the ultimate pervasive federal control."' The District Court
249 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
'Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 93.
449 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
'Aircraft Noise Policy Hearing, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 705 (1975-76).
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view was novel, since exclusive federal rule making power had never
before been asserted.
The PA's imposition of the 112 PNdB noise level requirement had
never been challenged by the federal government or by an air carrier.
The failure of the PA to apply an approved standing rule was not con-
sidered by the District Court.
The District Court's ruling dealt exclusively with the question of
federal supremacy and pre-emption. Adopting the reasoning set forth
by Secretary Coleman in the Directive and Order and apparently look-
ing only to the plain meaning of the statutes, Judge Pollack found that
since federal power was supreme in the field of noise abatement, the
PA's refusal to allow a Concorde test landing was improper.6 The ef-
fect of this ruling was that all powers of local airport operators became
mere delegations of power from federal authorities and were subject to
complete pre-emption at the option of a federal official or agency. The
question of the reasonableness of local regulations or actions was ig-
nored.
The Port Authority was ordered to permit the Concorde test to
proceed in accordance with the guidelines established by Secretary Cole-
man. The PA immediately appealed the case.
The Court of Appeals did not deal directly with the reasonableness
of the PA's decision since the question was never raised in the District
Court arguments. The court did submit that reasonableness was an
implicit component of the federal scheme of noise regulation. The
federal power was delegated to local authorities with the proviso that
control would be exercised in a fair, reasonable and responsible man-
ner. But since no evidence had been offered on the matter, the ques-
tion was remanded to the District Court.7
The mere fact that the issue had to await the evidentiary hearing
did not prevent the appellate court from pointing out that the failure
of the PA to act in a reasonable manner would "hinder the ac-
complishment of legitimate national goals" such as free flowing inter-
national commerce.
The appellate court also suggested that the treaty obligations of the
United States should be considered. Evenhanded treatment for British
and French air carriers was mandated by certain of these bilateral
treaties. Refering to these compacts, the airlines had argued that the
PA ban was not a valid and enforceable regulation since it was not
643 F. Supp. 1216, at 1226 (1977).
'558 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1977).
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generally applied but was an ad hoc measure directed solely at the
SST.8
The Concorde litigation was in fact having a disruptive effect on
the negotiations for the soon-to-expire Bermuda Agreement on U.S.-
U.K. transatlantic flights. Great Britain, which eventually won several
important concessions, including the award of new routes at the ex-
pense of American airlines, made mention of this fact and the court
was quick to agree that the situation was worthy of serious considera-
tion by the PA and the federal government. 9
After considering the above-mentioned factors, the Court of Ap-
peals remanded the case for a rehearing on the question of the
reasonableness of the Port Authority's ban on Concorde.
B. The Question of the Reasonableness of the Port
Authority's Decision
On remand, District Judge Pollack left no doubt as to the
unreasonableness of the PA's action. Thirteen months after the ban
was announced, the PA had been re-evaluating scientific and technical
data which long had been available that showed that the Concorde
could comply with all PA noise requirements, including the 112 PNdB
rule. Tests made at Dulles verified this finding.' 0 The failure to apply
reasonable noise standards to the SST was seen as a PA abdication of
the limited cooperative authority. Having forfeited the power, the ap-
propriate federal authority was then permitted to act. In this instance,
the Secretary of Transportation was the appropriate authority.
The court ruled that the ban unduly interfered with a valuable na-
tional objective and imposed an unfair restriction on the interests of
the United States. As a result of this ruling the operators of Concorde
were granted the right to land in New York.
The PA appealed again and on October 6, 1977, a three-judge
panel modified the earlier order. The panel ordered Concorde flights
to begin immediately. While repeating all the earlier judicial
statements that the ban was improper, this court did affirm the local
right to impose reasonable noise standards." The judicial hints were
finally picked up by the PA, for after the decision was announced it
81d. at 85.
VId. at 86.
"046 U.S.L.W. 2103 (1977).
1146 U.S.L.W. 2175 (1977).
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decided to enact a series of new noise standards which, while ostensibly
being reasonable, would also keep Concorde out of New York. 2
While pondering what type of new regulations would pass muster
with the courts, the PA appealed to the Supreme Court. Associate
Justice Thurgood Marshall delayed the effective date of the appellate
court's decision until October 24, 1977.1
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate court on
October 17, 1977, refusing to keep the ban in effect until a final deci-
sion could be made on the overall merits of the case.' 4 The first Con-
corde landed at JFK the next day, with only a test crew aboard,
meeting the existing noise requirements.
Unlike other areas of federal regulation in which the acts of Con-
gress were so comprehensive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for supplemental state action, federal statutes
and policy made it clear that cooperative state-federal regulation of
noise was envisioned. This shared power was to be exercised under
restrictions imposed by Congress. Congress only delegated power to
local authorities. It did not permanently assign or forfeit any of its
powers to the states. Such an action would have fractionalized the
noise regulation attempts.
Despite its protestations, the PA has recognized ultimate federal
pre-eminence in the area of noise control, as it has now begun con-
sideration of new noise standards that would meet requirements of
reasonableness. But with the first Concorde flights into New York hav-
ing aroused no complaints from local residents, there is the likelihood
that organized opposition to SST will vanish and that Concorde
will become a regular customer of JFK.
Peter E. Papps
2The idea of having Concorde land at Newark International Airport was con-
sidered, but only briefly. It was quickly apparent that the runways were too short to
accomodate the SST.
"N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1977, at 35, col. 3 (city ed.).
'
4N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1977, at 1, col. I (city ed.) (S.Ct. Oct. 17, 1977).
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